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In policy discussions, it has frequently been claimed that migrants’ remittances could 
function as a ‘catalyst’ for financial access among receiving households. This paper 
provides empirical evidence on this hypothesis from Mexico, a main receiver of 
remittances worldwide. Using the Mexican Family Life Survey panel (MxFLS) for 2002 
and 2005, the results from the treatment-effect-model at household level show that a change 
in remittance status has an important impact on ownership of savings accounts and the 
availability of borrowing options. This effect is significant for rural, but not for urban 
households and important for microfinance institutions, but not for traditional banks. 
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Introduction 
More than 10 percent of Mexico’s circa 110 million population live outside their country of 
birth, forming the largest group of immigrants in the US (Pew 2009). With more than 22 
billion USD of remittances transferred by Mexican migrants to their home country in 2009, 
Mexico is one of the main receivers of remittances worldwide, after China and India 
(World Bank 2011). Despite a 16 percent decrease following the US financial crisis in 
2008, remittances play an important role for in Mexican economy. They were about the 
same size as foreign direct investment to Mexico in 2008 and contributed to 2.4 percent of 
Mexican GDP (World Bank 2010). At the regional level, remittances are even more 
important: Michoacán und Zacatecas, the states with the highest emigration rates, had an 
income of remittances to GDP of 13.2 percent and 9.2 percent in 2006 (Banco de México 
2007). 
My research turns around a question, which has - although popular in policy discussions - 
received relatively little attention in the academic literature: Remittances and access to 
financial services among receivers. Looking at the direct effects of remittances on 
households and the use of these funds alone ignores important aspects of how remittances 
influence receiving countries. This paper draws attention to some of these indirect effects of 
remittances on the economies of receiving countries via financial intermediation. Moreover, 
it aims to improve the understanding of financial markets in developing countries, and how 
they relate to financial management of migrant households. 
A large part of the population in developing countries has no access to financial services. In 
most Latin American countries, only one-fourth of the population owns savings accounts, 
compared to shares above 90 percent for most Western European countries (Honohan 
2008). The lack of access to financial services among poor households limits their 
strategies for risk management and asset accumulation. Poor households often save cash or 
in the form of fixed assets like land and cattle and they have limited opportunities of 
receiving credits from formal financial institutions in order to face unforeseen shocks, 
finance larger purchases or to invest in small businesses (for a general discussion see 
Armendáriz de Aghion/Murdoch (2005) and for a literature review focusing on rural 
markets see Conning/Udry (2005). In Mexico, as in many other countries, many   3
remittance-receivers belong to the lower-income groups excluded from the (mainstream) 
financial system. Remittances are in most cases sent and received in cash, and are generally 
not regarded as a means of accessing other financial services, like credits. In this context, 
linking remittances with additional financial services can have positive indirect effects on 
receiving countries and has therefore become an important issue on the policy agenda (see 
for example Orozco 2004; Terry and Wilson 2005; Orozco and Fedewa 2006). First, 
receivers themselves may benefit from more efficient options of asset building through 
access to financial services. Beyond these direct benefits to receivers, linking remittances 
with financial services has potentially wider economic effects. Savings from remittances 
can be channeled to their most productive use and be matched with the demand for credit 
elsewhere, and also benefit those who do not receive remittances themselves. There is wide 
consensus among development economists that financial institutions play a crucial role in 
the process of economic development (see Levine 1997 for an overview). Cross-country 
studies have shown that a relative increase in savings and credit is associated with an 
increase in growth and per capita income (Goldsmith 1969; King and Levine 1993; Beck et 
al. 2000b, a). Access to financial services is a key dimension of financial development, 
because a more inclusive financial sector is capable of generating higher absolute levels of 
savings and investment, reduces dependence on foreign capital, and leads to more equitable 
development (Jalilian and Kirkpatrik 2002; Beck et al. 2007).  
This paper is organized as follows: Section I summarizes the state of the art on remittances 
and financial intermediation. Section II introduces the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS), a nationally representative panel data set at the individual and household level 
that allows combining information on remittances with access to and usage of financial 
services. Section III specifies the treatment-effect model of a change in remittance status on 
a change in financial access. Section IV discusses the results. I find an important impact of 
remittances on access to financial services, both measured as a change in ownership of 
savings accounts as well as on a change in the availability of borrowing options. This effect 
is important for rural households, but not significant for urban households and more 
important for microfinance institutions, than for commercial banks. The final section 
summarizes and interprets these findings.   4
Remittances and Financial Access: State of the Art 
In recent years, much research has been done on the manifold impacts of remittances on 
receiving countries
2. This paper focuses on the indirect effects remittances have on 
receiving countries via financial intermediation, a debate strongly dominated by policy 
papers and practitioners’ perspectives presenting case studies on financial institutions that 
have included remittances into their product portfolio and offer additional financial services 
to remittance receivers. Most of these case studies refer to institutions from the 
microfinance sector that focus on lower income clients (Orozco and Hamilton 2005; 
Hastings 2006; Orozco 2008). Their bottom line is that microfinance institutions match the 
profile of the typical clients of microfinance institutions better than those of commercial 
banks; and linking remittances with microfinance institutions therefore has important 
positive effects on receiving countries. While providing insights into the possibilities and 
potential of linking remittances with additional financial services, these studies allow little 
generalization of findings, do not systematically assess the remittance-receivers’ demand 
                                                 
2 Research on the impact of remittances on the receiving countries has focused on reducing poverty (Adams and 
Page 2003), the creation of growth through multiplier effects (Durand et al. 1996; Glytsos 2002), and their 
ambiguous effects on inequality in remittance-receiving countries (Jones 1998; Koechlin and León 2006; Acosta et 
al. 2008; Arslan and Taylor 2010). More pessimist authors have criticized that remittances reduce incentives for 
productive investment of resources in the countries of origin, (Chami et al. 2003) may lead to a loss in 
international competitiveness through the appreciation of the exchange rate (Amueda-Dorantes and Pozo 2004b; 
Acosta et al. 2007), and  are spent on luxury goods with few benefits for the local economy (Lipton 1980; Lazaar 
1987; Binford 2003). Recently, more optimistic positions have dominated research. A number of studies have 
found empirical evidence that receivers of remittances spend a larger share of their income on education (Cox 
Edwards and Ureta 2003; Hanson and Woodruff 2003; Yang 2005; Görlich et al. 2007; Adams and Cuecuecha 
2010), health (Amueda-Dorantes et al. 2007; Adams and Cuecuecha 2010) and entrepreneurship (Massey and 
Parrado 1998; Yang 2005; Woodruff and Zenteno 2007). Other studies have addressed the impact of remittances 
on the balance of payments of remittance-receiving countries (Buch et al. 2002; Sayan 2004; Bugamelli and 
Paternò 2005; Apaa-Okello and Aguyo 2006; Sayan 2006). As a-cyclical source of external finance, they help to 
stabilize the balance of payments and can play a strategic role in the prevention of financial crises. Also, in the 
wake of the recent global financial crises, remittances have proven to be more stable than other private capital 
flows like private lending, foreign direct investment or portfolio investment (Chami et al. 2009; Ratha and 
Mohapatra 2009).   5
for financial services or the success of such initiatives and do not quantify linkages between 
remittances and financial intermediation.  
In spite of figuring so prominently in development policy, academia has remained 
relatively silent on the issue and few studies have systematically approached the impact of 
remittances on the financial sector. Using a panel data set of 99 countries from 1975 to 
2003, Aggarwal et al. (2010) provide global-level evidence that remittances have led to 
deeper financial sectors in receiving countries, measured as savings and, to a lesser degree, 
credit in relation to GDP. Following a similar methodology, these findings were confirmed 
by Martinez-Pería et al. (2008) for Latin America, and by Gupta et al. (2009) for Sub-
Saharan Africa. Several arguments as to why remittances could be beneficial to financial 
development are brought forward by these authors. First, through remittances, banks 
operating as transfer providers and previously unbanked remittance-receivers might ‘get to 
know each other’, paving the way for further financial services. Second, remittances may 
create demand for financial services from receivers, because remittances are sent 
periodically and receivers need a safe place to store their savings. Finally, banks can earn 
income from remittance fees, creating an incentive to locate bank branches near remittance-
receivers (Aggarwal et al. 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011). Other authors stress cases 
where remittances might be accepted by financial institutions as a substitute for the lack of 
formal incomes (Orozco and Fedewa 2006). Cuecuecha/de la Rosa (2010) argue that 
changes in remittances not only affect income and poverty rates directly, but also indirectly 
by facilitating access to credit among receivers. Financial institutions paying remittances 
could build a financial history based on remittances for receivers who otherwise lack a 
formal income. Remittances could then be included as an additional income into a client’s 
evaluation when requesting credit. Moreover, remittances are sent out of altruistic motives 
and tend to increase and stabilize households’ income (Buch et al. 2002; Sayan 2004; 
Bugamelli and Paternò 2005); thereby reducing the default risk of credit takers. Because 
remittance receivers have additional ‘insurance’ in the form of remittances, they are less 
risky debtors from the bank’s point of view. 
Because remittances are sent out of altruistic motives and respond to families’ needs, 
remittances could also function as a substitute for credit and insurance from formal 
financial institutions. Several studies underline that a large part of remittances is spent on   6
health and other ‘emergency’ spending (Amueda-Dorantes and Pozo 2004a; Amueda-
Dorantes et al. 2007; Yang and Choi 2007). Remittance-receivers who demand financing – 
due to loss of work, illness or other sudden income shocks – are able to rely on an 
additional and relatively stable source of income, unavailable to non-receivers. 
Woodruff/Zenteno (2007) and Giuliano/Ruiz-Arranz (2009) explicitly argued that 
remittances function as a substitute for a lack of access to productive credits and play an 
important role in financing investment by micro-entrepreneurs. In this way, remittances 
compete with formal financial services, possibly reducing demand for credits and other 
financial products like insurance. 
Studies on the impact of remittances on the financial sector – as other research on 
remittances that rely on time series Central Bank data – are constrained by the quality of 
macro data. First, reducing transfer costs for formal money transfers shifted transfers from 
unregistered informal channels (friends, families, couriers, others) to formal transfers 
(MTO, banks). Second, Central Banks follow different methods of data collection and have 
changed their methodologies over time. Part of the strong rise in remittances is therefore 
due to a formalization of remittance flows and changes in data registration (Luna Martinez 
(2005), see Tuirán et al. (2006) and Canales (2008) for a discussion of the Mexican case). 
Empirical research conducted with Central Bank data must be interpreted with caution, 
especially for time series. 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011) took an alternative approach to studying the impact of 
remittances on financial development on a micro-level in their case study on Mexico. They 
crossed financial data with remittance data at the municipal level and found that the share 
of households receiving remittances in a municipality is correlated positively with deposits 
and, to a minor degree, with credits to GDP. In order to control for possible endogeneity 
between remittances and financial development (because a more developed financial sector 
might either induce the sending of more remittances or more migrants come from more 
financially developed regions), they additionally ran an instrumental variable regression 
using distance to railways as an instrumental variable for remittances.  
This paper contributes to the research questions and findings pioneered by Demirgüç-Kunt 
et al. and Aggarwal et al. and includes important additional issues. First, the MxFLS   7
provides a data source at the individual and household level, including information on the 
migration history, monetary transfers and the financial service usage of households. This 
allows me to take into account a broader set of socioeconomic variables correlated with 
financial service usage and remittances and to differentiate the impact of remittances 
according to different groups. Unlike Demirgüç-Kunt et al., I do not lose information by 
aggregating data to the municipal level. Second, most research on the impact of remittances 
on the financial sector has been restricted to the impact of remittances on the commercial 
banking sector, because generally only institutions under national banking regulation report 
data to the national financial authorities. The MxFLS includes financial service usage on 
formal and informal financial services. This allows me to include the non-traditional 
banking sector in the analyses, and to differentiate the impact of remittances on the 
financial sector by different kinds of institutions. Especially for poorer households in rural 
areas, where much of the Mexican migration originates (in 2002, around 40 percent of 
remittance-receiving households lived in rural communities with less than 2,000 habitants, 
see below), non-traditional banking institutions are much more important, because 
commercial banks rarely open branches in rural communities. Third, the same households 
in MxFLS are followed over time, allowing me to exploit the panel structure of the data set 
by running regressions on the differenced data (what is the effect of a change in remittance 
status on a change in financial access status?) and control for pre-‘treatment’ differences 
across groups. This makes my analysis less vulnerable to endogeneity concerns.  
The Data 
The MxFLS is a panel data survey jointly realized by the Centro de Investigación y 
Docencia Económica (CIDE) and the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. As a 
multi-thematic database, it allows the combination of information on financial service 
usage, migration histories, monetary transfers and a large number of additional 
socioeconomic characteristics of households and individuals. The raw data is organized in 
several thematic books. Data used for the present study rely on information from Book 1 
(household consumption), Book 2 (information on type and value of assets owned by the 
household, household shocks related to health, job/income loss or natural disasters), Book 
3a (ethnic composition, employment situation), Book 3b (migration history of household   8
members, transfers, use of financial services) and Book C (general household 
characteristics like the geographic location of the households and the number, gender and 
age of households members). MxFLS is a nationally representative sample of households 
that were selected under the criteria of national, urban-rural and regional representations on 
pre-established demographic and economic variables, undertaken by the National Institute 
of Geography Statistics and Information (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e 
Informática  INEGI). The approximate sampling size is 8,440 households with 
approximately 35,000 individual interviews in 150 communities throughout the Mexican 
Republic. Out of a total of four survey rounds that are planned until 2012, survey results for 
2002 and 2005 were available at the time of writing. The same households in the MxFLS 
are followed over time, so that changes across time can be observed for each household. 
Some households fell out of the sample because they could not be located the second time 
period for various reasons (they migrated, were deceased, etc). New households entered the 
sample when households from 2002 split into different households in 2005 (when 
household members left the household e.g. in the case of marriage or when household 
members moved away for other reasons). I am interested in the change in the access to 
financial services from 2002 to 2005 and therefore use a balanced data set, where I only 
include the 7,572 households that have been observed at both time periods (868 households 
of the 2002 sample were not included in the 2005 sample, an attrition rate of 11.5 percent).
3 
Questions regarding the use of financial services were asked individually to all adult 
household members. Based on this information, I create a dummy variable that takes the 
value ‘1’ when at least one household member owns a savings account with a financial 
institution (commercial banks, credit unions, savings banks or other formal or semi-formal 
institutions from the microfinance sector). Concerning credits, I proceed in the same way: 
The question of access to and use of credit are asked to individual household members. I 
create dummies for each household based on whether at least one household member 
knows a financial institution where he/she would be able to obtain a credit. A relatively 
large number of interviewees did not answer the questions on financial service usage and 
                                                 
3 See below for statistical measures that adjust for attrition bias   9
borrowing options, which reduces the number of observations available for the regression 
analysis (see Table 3 on the number of available observations for each of the variables). 
Households are not asked about receiving international remittances directly, but this 
information can be constructed by combining questions on whether households received 
monetary transfers during the last year (and by whom) and whether they have family 
members that live abroad. If at least one household member has received monetary 
transfers from a family member living in the US during the last year, I classify this 
household as a remittance-receiving household.
4 According to these calculations, 6.1 
percent of the households in 2002 received remittances and 6.8 percent of households in 
2005. In 2002, 43 percent of the remittance-receiving households lived in rural 
communities with less than 2,000 habitants (the definition applied by the national statistics 
office INEGI for rural households). 
                                                 
4In some cases, households could not be clearly classified into remittance-receiving households. Respondents only 
replied if they received transfers from a sibling, an uncle/aunt, parents, etc. For example, if a respondent has two 
brothers, one living in the US and another living in a different household in Mexico, it is not possible to know 
from the survey data whether the respondent received the transfer from the brother living in Mexico, or a 
different brother living in the US. I classify these households as remittance-receiving households, although there 
is some uncertainty in this classification and some of these transfers might actually be national remittances. Even 
so, I consider this variable to be a very good proxy for international remittances. The estimates for the share of 
remittance-receiving households based on this procedure are very similar to the estimates on remittances from 
other sources. According to (Esquivel and Huerta-Pineda 2007), estimations based on ENIGH 2002 (Encuesta 
Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares, a biannual household survey realized by the Mexican Statistics Institute 
INEGI) indicate that 5.7 precent of Mexican households received remittances in 2002. These have been 5.9 
percent households in 2008, with 41.1 percent of remittances going to rural households (based on ENIGH 2008, 
according to (Sánchez Ruiz 2010).     10
Table 1: Share of Households with Access to Savings Accounts and Borrowing 
Options, for Remittance-Receiving and Non-Receiving Households (2005) 
   receivers  non receivers 
savings account with a financial institution 





borrowing options with a financial institution 





Source: Own calculation based on MxFLS 2005 
 
Table 1 compares access to savings accounts and to borrowing options for receivers and 
non-receivers of remittances in 2005. Relatively few households in Mexico (around 15 
percent) own a savings account. More households (around 38 percent) have borrowing 
options with a financial institution. These data include savings accounts and borrowing 
options with non-commercial institutions and are lower when we look at savings accounts 
and borrowing options with commercial banks only (numbers in brackets). Although 
numbers are slightly higher for remittance-receivers, financial access among receivers is 
not fundamentally different from the average Mexican households.  These data provide a 
static picture on access to financial services among Mexican households and do not allow 
any causal interpretation. The empirical testing below refers to changes in financial access 
between 2002 and 2005 and how they were influenced by a change in remittance status.  
Access to financial services and the reception of remittances can be influenced by a number 
of factors, related to the socioeconomic status and geographic location of households. In 
order to control for differences across households, I include additional variables in the 
regression. First, I create a poverty score index for each household describing the 
probability of the household falling below a certain poverty line, valued 0 (lowest 
probability) to 100 (highest probability). The index is based on Schreiner (2009) and 
combines information on the number of children in the household, education levels, 
employment situation, housing conditions and household assets (see Annex 1 for a more 
detailed description). The score is used as a proxy for the socioeconomic status of a 
household through a one score summary. This allows controlling for a number of household 
characteristics at once, without including them separately in a regression. An index based 
on a combination of household characteristics is preferable to a measurement based on   11
monetary income, because a combination of different household characteristics accounts 
for more dimensions of poverty than an indicator based solely on income. Moreover, many 
households either do not report or underreport their monetary income in household surveys 
(Hurst et al. 2010). Next to this non-monetary poverty indicator, I also include monthly per 
capita spending of households as an indicator for income levels. 
Further variables included in the analysis are gender and age of the household head, 
whether the household head was working in the 12 months prior to the survey, an indicator 
whether households belong to an indigenous community, and whether households have 
suffered any shocks in the five years preceding the survey. These can be either economic 
shocks (loss of job or business failures), shocks related to health of household members 
(illness or death of household members), or natural disasters. I also include a dummy 
variable for whether households have received government support in 2002 through 
conditional cash transfers or other support programs. Some of these programs pay benefits 
through financial institutions and might therefore be correlated with changes in financial 
access. Finally, variables on the location of households are included: Whether households 
are situated in a rural area with less than 2,000 habitants, and the state in which the 
household is located (households in MxFLS are sampled from 16 out of the 32 Mexican 
states). In order to take into account differences in the supply of financial services across 
Mexican municipalities, I add an indicator for financial depth (the amount of per capita 
savings at commercial banks) as a covariate at the municipal level. Data for this indicator is 
available for commercial banks only and comes from the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de 
Valores (CNBV), the Mexican financial supervision agency. This indicator takes the value 
zero for 2,610 households (35 percent) living in municipalities without bank presence. See 
Table 2 for a summary of the variables and some descriptive statistics.    12
Table 2: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics 




























































dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households that received remittances in 2005, but did 











dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households where at least one household member 
owned a savings account in 2005, but no household 










dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households where at least one household member 
knows a financial institution where he could obtain a 






0.2  0  0.4  0  1  7,043 
shock  dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households that suffered any kind of negative shocks 
during the five years prior to the survey, either 
economic (loss of jobs, business failure), natural 
(floods, disasters, etc.) or personal (disease or death of 
household members) 
2002  MxFLS   0.3  0  0.5  0  1  7,276 
rural  dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households that live in locations with less than 2,000 
habitants 
2002  MxFLS 
C 
0.4  0  0.5  0  1  7,571 
household 
size 
number of household members  2002  MxFLS   4.3  4  2.1  1  17  7,572 
continued on next page 
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Table 2: Description of Variables and Summary Statistics - Continued 























































ethnic  dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ for 
households where an indigenous language is spoken  
2002  MxFLS 
3a 
0.2  0  0.4  0  1  7,221 
female  dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ when the 
household head is female 
2002  MxFLS 
C 
0.2  0  0.4  0  1  7,569 
age  age of the household head  2002  MxFLS 
C 
48  46  16  15  101  7,562 
government 
support 
dummy variable whether the household benefitted 
from government support programs 
2002  MxFLS 
2 




total monthly per capita spending of households, in 
Mexican pesos 
2002  MxFLS  
1 




dummy variable whether the household head had 
income-earning activities in the 12 months previous to 
the survey 
2002  MxFLS 
C 
0.8  1  0.4  0  1  7,569 
poverty score  one score summary for the probability that the 
household falls below a certain poverty line. The 
index is adapted from Schreiner (2009) and combines 
information on the number of children, education 
levels, employment situation, housing conditions and 
household assets (see annex for a detailed description) 
2002  MxFLS 
2, C, 3a 
58  60  17  0  100  7,266 
financial 
depth 
total bank deposits in thousand Mexican pesos divided 
by total population, at municipal level 
2002  CNBV
2  0.94  0.72  1.29  0  7.03  7,571 
1Mexican Family Life Survey 
2Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores 












I  am  interested  in  the  impact  of  belonging  to  a  remittance-receiving  household  on  the 
improvement of access to financial services among remittance-receivers. In order to test 
this link, I choose a treatment-effect setting where I run a cross-sectional regression on first 
differences of the explanatory and the outcome variable: How does a change in remittance 
status affect financial access?  The model to be estimated is 
 
∆        = ﾠ   + ﾠ  ∆     + ﾠ    ,     + ﾠ  , 
 
where ∆       stands for a change in access to financial services for household i, ∆Rem is 
the treatment variable and refers to a change in the remittance-receiving status of household 
i and X     is a vector of pre-treatment control variables for households i from 2002.   are 
the estimated coefficients and u stands for the usual error term. 
Mean differences on the outcome variable ∆       are compared between households that 
received the treatment ∆    ﾠ(379 households of the sample that received remittances in 
2005, but not in 2002) and the control group of all other households. Financial services 
include different forms and different kinds of services; ‘financial access’ can therefore be 
understood and measured in different ways. For example, a household might have access to 
semi-formal savings banks or credit unions, but not to traditional banks; or might have 
access to credit, but not to savings options. Here, I use two alternative indicators to measure 
financial access: First, whether at least one household member owns a savings account with 
a financial institution, a measurement frequently used in literature on financial access (for 
example Honohan 2008). Alternatively, I use access to borrowing options from financial 
institutions as an indicator for financial access. Households can ask for credits without 
owning a savings account. Many institutions in microfinance, such as the most important 
player in the Mexican Microfinance sector ‘Compartamos’, focus on lending only and do 
not offer savings. In the case of credits, I ask for the theoretical availability of credit, rather 
than  its  actual  use.  Because  I  want  to  measure  access,  it  is  more  interesting  to  know   15
whether households could receive a credit if they wanted to, not if they really did: 
Households simply might not have demand for a credit. In the case of savings, I am not 
able to measure the availability of savings options and instead measure the actual use 
(ownership) of savings accounts.
5 Using two alternative indicators for financial access 
allows me to draw a more nuanced picture on the impact of remittances on different 
dimensions of financial access. Both indicators for savings and borrowing options are 
measured as dummy variables that take the value ‘1’ for households that improved their 
financial access status between 2002 and 2005. 478 households gained access to savings 
accounts in this time period and 1,603 households gained access to borrowing options 
between 2002 and 2005. Next to these ‘improvers’, a large number of households also ‘lost’ 
access to financial services: 635 households in which at least one household member 
owned a savings account in 2002 did not own savings accounts in 2005; and 950 
households that had borrowing options in 2002, no longer had borrowing options in 2005. 
These negative changes may have different reasons, such as when members with access to 
financial services split into different households or when the socioeconomic situation of 
households worsens. The average share of households with access to financial services 
changes much less when looking at both, the ‘improvers’ and on those that ‘lose’ access. I 
am interested in the effect of remittances on gaining access to financial services and 
therefore focus only on improvements in access to financial services
6. In order to measure 
the impact of remittances on the binary outcome variable, I use a logit model. 
‘Treatment’ is a term that originally comes from biostatistics, where treatment conditions 
are applied randomly and can be controlled by researchers. In social sciences, research 
usually relies on observational data where treatment is not a random factor and households 
                                                 
5 Of course, households that have borrowing options can still be denied a credit. For robustness, I will also test 
the impact of a change in remittance status on the actual use of credit from financial institutions. 
6 In a previous version of this paper, the effect of remittances on both dependent variables was run: A regression 
for those who ‘gained’ access and a second model for those who ‘lose’ access. In the second model, the 
hypothesis to be tested would then be if it is less probable for remittance-receiving households to ‘lose’ access. 
Although the basic story remains the same, for the sake of clarity of the argument and simplicity, the empirical 
model focuses only on the positive impact of remittances on financial access.   16
self-select into either treatment or control groups. As a result, there can be systematic 
differences between units of ‘treatment’ and units of ‘control’. Therefore, all pre-treatment 
variables associated with both the assignment of a treatment condition (change in 
remittance status) and with the expected outcome (change in financial access) should be 
controlled for (cp. Gelman and Hill 2006: 183ff). Instead of making the unrealistic 
assumption of random treatment assignment, the weaker assumption of ‘ignorability of 
treatment assignment’ or ‘selection on observables’ is made. Under this assumption, the 
distribution across treatment and control groups is random with respect to outcomes, 
conditional on the confounding covariates. The panel data set allows taking into account 
systematic differences across groups before they receive the ‘treatment’ and to control for 
the confounding covariates. A vector 
 
of pre-treatment controls is included in the 
regression referring to socioeconomic status of households i in 2002 (see Table 2 for an 
overview). Variables for the geographic location of households intend to capture important 
differences between rural and urban households. Financial indicators may have developed 
differently in rural, as compared to urban, households between 2002 and 2005. Controlling 
for the state where a household is located captures region-specific differences that can not 
be explained at the household level, such as regional shocks, regionally different evolutions 
of financial markets and differences in growth rates across Mexican states. Finally, I 
control for selection bias that may arise from households dropping out of the sample 
between 2002 and 2005. Following the two-step procedure proposed by Heckman (1979), a 
variable that measures the probability for each household to fall out of the sample in 2005 
is used as additional predictor in the regression below. 
In the literature on treatment-effect-models, matching techniques between treatment and 
control groups (such as propensity scores) are popular in order to improve the balance 
between treatment and control groups. Even if ‘ignorability of treatment assignment’ can be 
achieved by including observed pretreatment covariates, estimations can be biased when 
the distribution of variables differs strongly across treatment and control groups 
(King/Zeng (2006); Cochran/Rubin (1973); cp. Gelman/Hill 2006: 206ff). However, 
imbalance or lack of overlap among groups of treatment and control is not a strong concern 
in this specific context. The comparison of key variables between the two treatment groups 
and the control group show no evidence of a very strong imbalance between the groups’   17
socioeconomic profile (see Annex 1). In Mexico, migration is a phenomenon of low to 
middle income groups and the profile of remittance-receiving households is not radically 
different from the ‘average’ Mexican households. I therefore discard propensity scores or 
other methods of exact matching between treatment and control groups to get a better 
balance across groups, because this would mean ignoring much information contained in 
the complete data set. 
Regression Results 
After evaluating different fits to the data (by significance of the variables, residual 
deviance, Akaike Information Criteria and the distribution of residuals), I finally settled on 
the models presented in Table 3. Table 3 gives regression results for two alternative 
outcome variables: Positive changes in the ownership of savings accounts (Estimations I to 
III), and positive changes in the availability of borrowing options (Estimations IV to VI). 
Each of the two outcome variables is specified alternatively with subsets on rural 
households only and on urban households only, next to a pooled regression on all 
households with an interaction term between treatment and rural. All covariates in the table 
are pre-treatment variables from 2002.  
Coefficients for the two indicators of financial access - ownership of savings accounts and 
availability of borrowing options - follow, in general, similar tendencies. In both pooled 
specifications on all households (Regression I and IV in Table 3), the coefficients for 
’rural’ are negative and significant, meaning that rural households had a lower probability 
of improving their access to financial services between 2002 and 2005. The probability of 
improving access to savings accounts and borrowing options in the following period was 
also lower for poorer households. This is true when measured via the monetary poverty 
indicator (log of monthly per capita spending) as well as via the non-monetary poverty 
indicator (poverty score). This correlation is as expected, because poor households face 
more obstacles in gaining access to financial services. Also, households that received any 
kind of government support in 2002 had a lower probability of gaining access to borrowing 
options between 2002 and 2005. Although, in principle, government support programs 
could positively impact access to financial services when paid through financial 
institutions, the negative sign might reflect a negative correlation of targeted government   18
programs with households’ income levels.  The larger the household size in 2002, the 
higher the probability was that at least one household member gained access to savings 
accounts and borrowing options in the following period. While there was no clear and 
significant change in access to savings accounts for households that suffered any kind of 
personal, economic or natural shock previous to the 2002 survey, rural households that 
experienced a shock in 2002 showed a more restricted access to borrowing options in 2005. 
In some specifications the age of the household head is significant, with households headed 
by older persons having a lower probability of gaining access to financial services in the 
following period. Belonging to an indigenous community shows a negative sign, but this 
variable is only significant in Specification IV. Income-earning activities of the household 
head in 2002 was not an important predictor for a change in financial access in most 
specifications. In rural households, when households were headed by a woman in 2002, 
they had a higher probability of a positive change in owning a savings account compared to 
households headed by men, but there was no gender difference with respect to the 
availability of borrowing options. On the other hand, urban households headed by women 
had a lower probability of improving access to borrowing options. Interestingly, the 
development of the formal banking sector (measured as average amount of savings per 
capita in the municipality) shows no significant correlation with a change in financial 
access in the following period. Finally, the table includes state fixed effects (dummies for 
each of the 16 states included in the sample, with Baja California Sur as a baseline) for each 
specification. The output table shows important regional variations across states with regard 
to the change in financial access from 2002 to 2005, with respect to both owning a savings 
account and access to credit. 
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Table 3: Logit Regression Results 















-4.597 *** -7.525 *** -3.303 ***  -2.104 *** -3.639 *** -1.459 *** (Intercept) 
(-0.697) (-1.372) (-0.893)  (-0.424) (-0.785) (-0.553)
-0.011 0.988 *** -0.028 -0.075 0.493 *** -0.047 treatment (“household becomes 
remittance-receiver”)  (-0.287) (-0.284) (-0.289)  (-0.184) (-0.187) (-0.186)
0.964 ** 0.656 ** treatment:rural 
(-0.391) (-0.255)
-0.584 *** -0.504 *** rural 
(-0.167) (-0.096)
0.094 0.487 * -0.003 -0.146 * 0.036 -0.236 ** female 
(-0.14) (-0.272) (-0.166)  (-0.087) (-0.155) (-0.107)
0.01 0.6 * -0.304 -0.068 -0.14 -0.02 working household head 
(-0.167) (-0.318) (-0.219)  (-0.101) (-0.17) (-0.141)
-0.071 -0.199 -0.095 -0.18 * -0.192 -0.031 ethnic 
(-0.163) (-0.279) (-0.209)  (-0.095) (-0.148) (-0.133)
-0.01 0.002 -0.022 **  -0.012 *** -0.023 *** -0.006 age of household head 
(-0.006) (-0.012) (-0.01) (-0.004) (-0.007) (-0.006)
-0.036 -0.27 -0.015 -0.089 -0.306 ** -0.015 shock 
(-0.117) (-0.226) (-0.148)  (-0.07) (-0.122) (-0.093)
0.153 *** 0.229 *** 0.105 **  0.101 *** 0.114 *** 0.091 *** household size 
(-0.033) (-0.056) (-0.046)  (-0.02) (-0.033) (-0.027)
0.05 -0.194 0.106 -0.038 -0.073 0.016 financial depth 
(-0.069) (-0.207) (-0.082)  (-0.042) (-0.111) (-0.051)
0.023 *** 0.024 *** 0.025 ***  0.008 *** 0.024 *** -0.004 poverty score 
(-0.005) (-0.009) (-0.006)  (-0.003) (-0.005) (-0.004)
0.17 ** 0.268 ** 0.149 0.136 *** 0.234 *** 0.09 log of monthly per capita spending 
(-0.072) (-0.128) (-0.093)  (-0.042) (-0.07) (-0.055)
-0.183 -0.019 -0.335 -0.338 *** -0.21 * -0.592 *** government support 
(-0.157) (-0.225) (-0.275)  (-0.09) (-0.123) (-0.174)
Coahuila  -0.689 ** -1.081 -0.671 *  0.2 0.118 0.213
  (-0.327) (-0.893) (-0.358)  (-0.198) (-0.414) (-0.23)
Distrito Federal  0.096 1.571 -0.085 0.74 ** 1.98 ** 0.124
  (-0.512) (-1.511) (-0.57) (-0.335) (-0.829) (-0.387)
Durango  -0.519 -0.407 -0.573 -0.465 ** -0.245 -0.537 **
state 
  (-0.323) (-0.649) (-0.4) (-0.216) (-0.395) (-0.271)
Continued on next page   20
Table 3: Logit Regression Results - Continued 















Guanajuato  0.487 * 0.52 0.546 *  0.522 *** 1.211 *** 0.218
  (-0.282) (-0.626) (-0.33) (-0.196) (-0.374) (-0.24)
Jalisco  -0.298 0.494 -0.386 0.362 * 0.33 0.266
  (-0.314) (-0.677) (-0.379)  (-0.202) (-0.437) (-0.245)
México  -0.815 ** -0.359 -1.027 **  -0.188 0.429 -0.546 **
  (-0.345) (-0.672) (-0.43) (-0.203) (-0.371) (-0.256)
Michoacán  -0.389 -0.099 -0.453 0.412 ** 0.464 0.582 **
  (-0.303) (-0.616) (-0.37) (-0.189) (-0.359) (-0.234)
Morelos  -0.458 -0.195 -0.674 *  0.43 ** 1.076 *** -0.13
  (-0.327) (-0.691) (-0.397)  (-0.202) (-0.376) (-0.266)
Nuevo León  -0.264 -0.165 -0.143 0.084 0.904 ** -0.273
  (-0.315) (-0.678) (-0.412)  (-0.205) (-0.388) (-0.276)
Oaxaca  0.06 -0.101 0.144 0.308 0.846 ** 0.059
  (-0.302) (-0.682) (-0.342)  (-0.202) (-0.38) (-0.248)
Puebla  -0.024 0.336 0.027 -0.084 0.855 * -0.479
  (-0.343) (-0.734) (-0.434)  (-0.23) (-0.441) (-0.294)
Sinaloa  -0.053 0.16 -0.103 0.351 * 0.377 0.317
  (-0.272) (-0.601) (-0.313)  (-0.184) (-0.362) (-0.218)
Sonora  -0.771 ** -1.056 -0.66 * 0.309 * 0.505 0.28
  (-0.305) (-0.734) (-0.34) (-0.186) (-0.362) (-0.222)
Veracruz  -0.393 0.555 -0.725 **  0.287 0.954 ** 0.113
  (-0.296) (-0.631) (-0.351)  (-0.189) (-0.373) (-0.225)
Yucatán  -0.09 0.773 -0.267 -0.478 ** 0.637 -0.954 ***
state 
  (-0.333) (-0.742) (-0.381)  (-0.242) (-0.461) (-0.291)
-1.947 0.931 -3.943 -1.113 -10.256 ** 0.668 Heckman attrition correction 
(-1.67) (-7.817) (-2.538)  (-1.001) (-4.46) (-1.498)
residual deviance  2928 935 1963 6801 2515 4186
degrees of freedom  5646 2584 3036 6662 2967 3669
AIC  2988 991 2019 6861 2571 4242
Standard errors in brackets. Stars denote significance at 1 percent (***), 5 percent(**) and 10 percent(*) 
 The main interest lies on the coefficients for the treatment effect (households that report a 
positive change in their remittance-receiving status). Concerning the change in savings 
accounts, the treatment shows an important and significant impact on a change in financial 
access. As expected by theory, households that ‘improved’ their remittances status had a 
higher probability of becoming owners of a savings account in 2005. However, this effect 
holds for rural households only and not for the subset on urban households. Also, when 
measuring financial access as the availability of borrowing options, households in the 
treatment group show a positive and significant probability of improving their access status 
in 2005. Again, as in the case of savings accounts, the estimated effect on borrowing 
options holds for rural households, but is not significant for the subset of urban 
households.
7  
In addition to the regression output in Table 3, Graph 1 plots the coefficients and 
confidence intervals for the treatment effect in order to summarize graphically how a 
change in remittance status on a change in financial access differently affects subgroups 
and outcome variables. The black lines show the treatment effect for all six specifications 
from Table 3. As mentioned, treatment effects are most important for the subset of rural 
households, for both a change in ownership of savings accounts and a change in borrowing 
options.  
Additionally, the graph plots estimates for the same specifications, but for different types of 
financial institutions. Regressing the treatment effect on non-traditional banking institutions 
only (credit unions, savings banks and other institutions from the microfinance sector), 
increases the magnitude as well as the significance of the effect (upper grey lines). 
However, in the regression on the commercial banking sector only, a positive change in 
                                                 
7 As mentioned above, the availability of borrowing options does not mean that households really make use of 
credits. For robustness, I also tested the effect of a change in remittance status on actual borrowing. In this case, 
the overall effect of remittances is also positive and significant, but it is not significant for the subset on rural 
households, which indicates that rural households use savings options much more than credits. Explanations 
could be that rural households in general demand less credit compared to urban households and are net providers 
of savings to the financial system. It also points to the possibility that, as discussed above, remittances function as 
a substitute for credit from formal financial services, especially in rural households.   22
remittance status does not have a significant effect on financial access. This suggests that 
the impact of remittances is more important for non-traditional financial institutions from 
the microfinance sector, than for the commercial banking sector. These results support the 
argument made by (Orozco and Hamilton 2005; Hastings 2006; Orozco 2008), among 
others, that institutions from the microfinance sector are often ‘closer’ to remittance 
receivers both socially and geographically and are therefore better positioned to link 
remittances with further financial services.  
 
Graph 1: Estimated Effects of a Change in Remittance Status on a Change in 
Financial Access for Different Indicators and Subgroups 
estimated change in 
 savings accounts




estimated change in 
 borrowing options





The graph plots estimates for the treatment effect (becoming a remittance-receiving 
household in 2005) on a positive change in ownership of savings accounts and availability 
of borrowing options with 50 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals for all (upper 
plotted lines), rural (middle) and urban (lower plotted lines) households. The black lines in 
the middle of each set of plotted lines show estimates and confidence intervals for the 
regression on all types of financial institutions as given in Table 3. Alternatively, I also 
provide estimates for a regression on microfinance institutions only (upper grey lines) and 
on commercial banks only (lower grey lines). Estimates are given in logit scale.  
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All coefficients are given in the logit scale. In order to provide an idea of the magnitude of 
the effect on the original scale, I calculate the probabilities for a change in financial access 
for the treatment group and predict the effect of treatment on a change in financial access 
for those coefficients that are significantly different from zero, while fixing all other 
variables at their median
8. In the specification estimating the effect of remittance status on 
an improvement of ownership of savings accounts for all households (the pooled 
Regression I in Table 3), the predicted probability of improving financial access is 4.2 
percentage points higher for households in the treatment group compared to the control 
group. For borrowing options, the predicted difference is at a similar magnitude (4.4 
percentage points). For rural households (Regression II and IV in Table 3), these 
differences are even larger: In the treatment group, the predicted probability of improving 
access to financial services is 7.4 percentage points higher for borrowing options compared 
to the control group, and 6.8 percentage points higher for savings accounts. These 
differences are important considering the relatively low absolute number of households 
with access to financial services (in 2005, only 15 percent of households owned savings 
accounts and 38 percent had borrowing options at financial institutions, see Table 1 above). 
Conclusion 
This paper contributes to understanding how remittances influence economic development 
in receiving countries by focusing on a relatively neglected research topic, the impact of 
remittances on access to financial services. The results are important because they 
underline some of the indirect effects of remittances on receiving countries. Focusing solely 
on the spending of remittances misses an important part of the picture. 
As the results show, remittances have an important effect on access to financial services 
among receiving households in Mexico. A change in remittance status has a statistically 
significant positive effect on both the ownership of savings accounts and the availability of 
borrowing options. Going beyond previous research, the detailed panel data of the multi-
thematic MxFLS allows the differentiation of the impact of remittances on the financial 
                                                 
8 I fixed covariates at their median and not at their mean, because the median can be interpreted more easily for 
the dummy variables in the regression.    24
sector according to different types of financial institutions and by rural vs. urban 
households. With a probability of improving their access status seven percentage points 
higher than the control group, the treatment effect of remittances on financial access is 
important and statistically significant for rural households, but small and not statistically 
significant for urban households. Next to this rural-urban difference, a different impact 
according to different types of institutions can be observed. The estimated effect of a 
change in remittance status on financial access is more important for non-traditional 
banking institutions, compared to commercial banks. These findings support the argument 
that microfinance institutions are particularly well suited for linking remittances with 
further financial services (Orozco and Hamilton 2005; Hastings 2006; Orozco 2008). 
Initiatives aiming to strengthen linkages between remittances and microfinance institutions, 
often lacking the infrastructure and access to global payment systems needed to offer 
remittance payments, could therefore generate additional benefits for receiving countries. 
Remittances are private income of transnational households. Institutional frameworks that 
open monetary savings and borrowing options and provide more efficient use of 
remittances for families are therefore more promising than a paternalistic debate on the 
‘correct’ use of these incomes. 
My own findings, based on household survey data, partly contrast previous studies that 
found a positive correlation between remittances and commercial banking. These studies 
used either municipal level bank data (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2011) or cross-country Central 
Bank data (Aggarwal et al. 2010; Gupta et al. 2009), but did not take into account non-
traditional financial institutions, which fall outside banking regulations and are therefore 
not captured by official data. Nevertheless, they are the most important financial service 
providers for low-income groups in developing countries. At least in the case of Mexico, 
traditional banks do not seem the most adequate institutions for linking remittances with 
further financial services, though technically better prepared for including remittances into 
their product portfolio. Many banks in Mexico do pay remittances: ‘Bancomer’ alone has 
an estimated share of 60 percent in the Mexican remittance market (Hernández-Coss 2005). 
However, in most cases, remittances are sent and received in cash, with bank branches 
functioning as paying agents to US-based money transfer operators. In the Mexican case, 
commercial banks apparently do not use their market power for gaining new clients among   25
remittance-receivers. Due to the differences of financial and remittance markets and 
differing socioeconomic profiles of migrants between countries, future research must 
demonstrate whether the results from the Mexican case can be generalized to different 
contexts.  
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Annex 
Annex 1: Creation of a Poverty Score for Mexican Households, adapted from 
Schreiner (2009) 
   Scoring Indicator  Book Answers  Points
four or more  0 
three 7 
Two 15 
one   22 
1  Number of household members aged 
0 to 17 
C 
none 29 
college preparatory or less  0 
normal/technical/comercial 4 
2  Highest educational grade among 
household members 
C 
professional or graduate  10 
none 0 
One 7 
3  Number of household members with a 
written employment contract 
3a 
two or more  14 
Dirt 0 
cement/concrete 8 
4  Main flooring type used in residence  C 
other 12 
Yes 3  5  Tap water inside the house  C 
No 0 
firewood 0  6  Fuel usually used to cook or heat food  C 
other 5 
Yes 7  7  Household has domestic appliances 




Yes 7  8  Electric appliances used in the 




Yes 13  9  Household has other assets like dryer, 




   maximum value   100 
Creation of a ‘poverty score’ for each household: A score of ‘100’ indicates the lowest 
probability of belonging to a poor households and a score of ‘0’ indicates the highest 
probability of belonging to a poor household. The scoring is based on Schreiner (2009) and 
has been developed in order to allow a quick and easy assessment of the socioeconomic 
conditions of households. Questions 7 to 9 have been adapted to the availability of data. 
Incomplete data on some variables have been imputed using the ‘mice’ package (Buuren 
and Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2010) in the statistical software R (R Development Core Team 
2009)   27
Annex 2: Examining Balance of Treatment and Control Group 
Standardized Differences in Pre-Treatment Means, 
for both treatment groups compared to the control group
standardized difference in means
-0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
family members in the US  
rural  
female household head  
age of household head  
government support  
household size  
household shocks  
indigenous  
poverty score  
per capita spending  
working household head  
banking presence in municipality  
 
The graph shows differences in pre-treatment means in order to see how much the 
treatment group differs from the control group on variables expected to predict both 
treatment and outcome. Differences in means have been standardized (differences in 
averages of the two groups divided by the pooled standard deviation for the treatment and 
control groups) and are given in standard deviation units to make them comparable. The 
variable that varies most between treatment and control groups is the number of family 
members in the US. It is worth noting that the data refers to means in 2002 while the 
treatment group received remittances only in 2005, but not in 2002. Many households in 
the treatment group already had family members in the US in 2002, but received 
remittances only in the following period. Other variables that differ between treatment and 
control groups are  households’ location (rural or urban),  as well as gender and age of the 
household head. In the treatment group, less household heads were working in 2002 and 
fewer households lived in municipalities that had banks. The graphical representation is 
based on Gelmann/Hill (2006: 202).    28
Annex 3: Binned Residual Plots  


































































The graphs show residual plots from Regressions II and VI in Table 4. The residuals follow 
no obvious patterns and are apparently randomly distributed. Because the data is discrete, 
dividing the data into categories (bins) is more appropriate for examining the distribution 
of residuals. Each bin represents an equal number of data points and shows their average 
residual against their average expected value. The lines indicate plus/minus 2 standard 
error bounds, where 95 percent of the residuals should fall. The plot is based on the 
function binnedplot() in the package ‘arm’ (Gelman et al. 2010) from the statistical 
software R (R Development Core Team 2009), see also Gelman/Hill (2006: 97f).   29
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